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Summary findings
The macroeconomic impact of commodity windfalls has  shocks threaten  the economy's fiscal balance and
provided fertile ground for research since the 1970s.  stability.
Particularly affected are developing economies that rely  Policy options for protecting the economy from
heavily on commodity exports. In the case of oil  volatility in oil revenues without eliminating the benefits
windfalls, cross-country experience is vast: Indonesia,  from rising prices include a stabilization fund and
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Russian Federation,  hedging strategies on international markets, which the
and Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela have all been  authors discuss. The stabilization fund smooths
buffeted by such windfalls. Everhart and Duval-  consumption and reduces the costs associated with
Hernandez investigate Mexico's experience.  volatile spending. The fund and hedging strategies can
They provide an overview of oil's impact on the  complement  each other-the  fund working as the main
Mexican economy and of the management of oil rents  recipient of revenues, and the hedging strategies
engineered by the government from the 1970s to date. A  managing short-lived movements in prices. This joint
third of government revenues come from the  strategy would also reduce the size of the fund and the
hydrocarbon sector-especially  oil exports. The reliance  probability of its going bankrupt.
of public finances on a single commodity means that
This paper-a  joint product  of the Mexico Country Management  Unit and the Economics Department,  International
Finance Corporation-is  part of a larger effort to foster research on macroeconomic management in developing economies.
Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact
Marylou Kam-Cheong, room F7K-270, telephone 202-473-9618, fax202-974-4306,  email address mkam-cheong@ifc.org.
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The authors may be contacted
at severhart@aifc.org  or rd75@cornell.edu.  April 2001.  (32 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findintgs of work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterManagement  of Oil Windfalls in Mexico: Historical
Experience  and Policy Options for the Future
Stephen Everhart




1.1  The macroeconomic impact of commodity windfalls has provided fertile research
grounds for the last twenty years. Particularly affected are developing economies with a
heavy  reliance  on  commodity  exports.  In  the  case  of  oil  windfalls,  cross-country
experience is vast: Nigeria, Indonesia, Venezuela and Mexico are examples of countries
buffeted by these windfalls. This study will investigate the Mexican experience.
1.2  Since the beginning of the twentieth century Mexico has utilized its oil resources
in a significant manner. In 1938, the oil
16  Figure  1.1  Oil Production  as a Percent  of GDP  industry  was  nationalized  by  the
Source:  Ministry  ofEnergv  President Lazaro Cardenas, initiating a
14
12  period  of  state  control  in  the
hydrocarbons  sector  that  continues
10  today.  In  the  decades  of
S  8-  . industrialization,  oil's  importance  in
6-  the  economy  diminished  as
4  manufacturing  and  service  sectors
2  grew. By the beginning  of the  1970s,
190  192the  oil  sector  represented  only  2.5
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998  percent of  GDP and  3.5 percent of
federal government tax revenues.
1.3  In recent years oil production's importance to the Mexican economy has varied,
fluctuating from almost 14 percent of GDP in  1983, down to  1.7 percent  in  1999. As
figure 1.2 shows, oil exports (as
a  percentage  of  total  exports)  Figure  1.2 Composition  of Exports
have  also  decreased  over  time.  Source:  INEGI
Although this suggests a relative  l
lessening of  the dependency on  °
oil  exports,  it  is  important  to  60%
note  that  oil  revenues  still  °
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public sector revenues, and since  20%l
the  late  1970s  the  Mexican
government  has  relied  on  oil  n  Z  6  a  9e
revenues  for  financing  5  q  g  i
expenditures and managing debt.  E oil exports  C non-oil  exports
1.4  This  study  provides  an
overview of the impact of oil on the Mexican economy, and the management of oil rents
engineered by the government  from the  1970s to  date. The  first section provides an
overview of the impact of the oil industry on the economy during the last twenty-five
years.  Section two reviews the main findings of the literature on rent management of
commodity windfalls.  Sections three and four describe the Mexican  experience in  oil
2rents management from 1973 to 1986 and from 1986 to date., The last section concludes
and presents policy recommendations.
' 1986  represents  a natural  break point for  the study,  it is the year of the greatest  oil  price drop in  Mexico's
experience  with  exports.
3I. OIL AND THE MEXICAN ECONOMY
1.5  After twenty years of economic stability and growth (the so-called "desarrollo
estabilizador" period), Mexico began the 1970s with a new administration  ushering in
new macroeconomic policies. Troublesome outcomes of Luis Echeverria's administration
included: increased public expenditure without a corresponding increase in government
revenues, greater intervention of the state in the economy, growing inflation,  a large
foreign debt  resulting  from  aggressive public  sector borrowing,  and  an  overvalued
exchange rate. By 1976 private capital fled the country and a balance of payments crisis
ensued, forcing the government to abandon exchange rate controls, leading to  a peso
devaluation of 40 percent. 2
1.6  During  this  period  major  changes  occurred  in  the  oil  market.  The  Arab  oil
embargo of October 1973 rocketed oil prices by almost 400 percent and roiled the world
economy. About  that  time,  PEMEX, the  Mexican  state-owned  oil  enterprise,  made
important  discoveries  of  petroleum  reserves  in  the  south  of  the  country.  Initial
consequences of the oil shock were negative for Mexico because production was inward
oriented and did not cover domestic demand, however in the long run the internal and the
external shocks were going to radically change the Mexican economy.
1.7  In  1976 Jose  L6pez Portillo was  elected president, bringing  with  him  a  new
economic strategy, a strategy basing economic growth on the exploitation of the recently
discovered oil reserves. L6pez Portillo hoped to emerge from the recession via increased
oil exports at favorable prices and relaxed fiscal constraints.
1.8  The Mexican  government used revenues  from the  new  oil  exports  largely to
finance major  investment programs.  In a  famous  speech to  the  Congress Jorge Diaz
Serrano, the Director of PEMEX, stated:
The World can be sure of some twenty more years living in the petroleum era,
and  Mexico  has  this  time  to  generate wealth  by  taking  advantage of  high
demand levels [and] high price levels paid at present and that will continue to
rise until the year 2000. [  ...] The political cost for the country would be too high
if  we  delay  the  construction  of  a  powerful  production platform  that  grants
ourselves a permanent place in the world concert [...Mexico] will be stronger as
the power of its oil industry augments, but we should never forget that this is a
race against the clock. 3
1.9  This  statement  shows,  at  least  to  a  certain  extent,  that  the  government  was
conscious of the fragility of funding development of the country with oil production, and
indicates that mismanagement came about as a result of excessively optimistic oil price
forecasts.
1.10  During the  1973-1981 period several imbalances  and  inadequate policies  had
accumulated and  increased the  fragility of  the economy. The  current  account deficit
2 For a brief sunmmary  on the macroeconomic environment during this period see Lustig (1992), ch.2 and
Garcia  Alba  and Serra (1984),  ch. 1-3.
'Morales  et. al. (1988), p.91
4widened, generated by a  rise in  intermediate goods imports. These imbalances in  the
external accounts 4 were financed with external borrowing as the Mexican peso became
increasingly overvalued. No longer sustainable, in 1981 a massive capital flight occurred,
eliciting a government response of attempting to finance this flight with further short-
term foreign borrowing. These policy missteps, coupled with the downturn in oil prices,
led to the Mexican debt crisis of 1982. As Garcia and  Serra (1984) point out, "if  the
downturn in  [oil] prices had a dramatic impact at the end of the administration it was
because the imbalances in fiscal and balance of payments accounts had reached a level
that made them extremely sensitive to foreign currency."
1.11  In February 1982 the government devalued the peso by 70 percent. Although the
current account deficit was largely corrected with this devaluation, the overall balance of
payments deficit did  not improve due to the increasing interest payments  on external
debt. Adding to the malaise were the following missteps: creation of a dual exchange rate
system, suspension of payments on its external debt, implementation of foreign exchange
controls, and nationalization of the private banks. Meanwhile, oil prices continued their
declining trend until mid-1983. Over this period crude lost nearly 30 percent of its value,
but still remained close to the end-1979 value (see Fig. 1.3).
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1.12  In  the  years  following, the  Mexican  government  initiated  radical  structural
adjustments aimed at meeting the crushing debt burden, some in response to conditions
4 By 1981 the trade deficit amounted to 3725.4 million US$, but excluding PEMEX transactions this deficit
rises to 16044.7 million US$. See Garcia Alba and Serra (1984).
5for receiving financial support of the IMF. From  1982 to  1985 the Mexican economy
went  into  a  severe  recession.  Structural  adjustment policies  had  minor  success  in
reordering the economy, and  although oil prices remained stable  around 25  US$ per
barrel, by the end of 1985 another balance of payments crisis gripped the economy.
Box 1. Dutch Disease
Dutch  Disease arises when  a natural resource  windfall generates a sudden  increase in export  earnings and
draws resources  out  of the production  of traded  goods.  So named after  the crisis suffered  in the 1960's
by  the  Dutch  manufacturing  sector,  caused  by  the  export  boom  in  the  natural  gas  industry.  The
phenomenon  could just as easily be called the Indonesian-Mexican-Nigerian-Venezuelan  (oil), Thai  (rice,
rubber,  tin),  Colombian  (coffee),  Ivory  Coast  (coffee,  cocoa,  wood),  or  Zambian,  Zairian  (copper)
disease.
Increased  revenues  resulting  from  a commodity  boom  increase  the demand  for  goods  in the  economy
and raise the price of non-tradables.  As the price  of tradable goods  are internationally  fixed, the impact
of higher wages  and real exchange  rate appreciation  diminish  the overall productivity  in the sectors  that
produce  those  goods.  The  long-run  effects  in the  economy  are  uncertain  depending  on  the  specific
macroeconomic  conditions  of  the country  and the  policy response  of  the authorties.  However,  in the
short-run.  Dutch  Disease has Dosed auite a challenLye  to several develonina  economnies.
1.13  Before going any further with the analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the
oil windfalls on the economy, some clarification of the nature of this episode is in order.
Among the direct implications of the "Dutch Disease" syndrome are the appreciation of
real exchange rate during the boom period and the diversion of resources away from the
non-booming trading sectors. Examining Figure 1.4 it can be seen that until 1986 the real
effective exchange rate and oil prices moved together, however in the years following,
their movement appears unrelated.
Figure 1.4 Real Effective Exchange Rate vs. Oil Prices
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61.14  Further, a  review of Table  1.1 reveals that  GDP growth by sectors  continued
apace. It can be seen that the non-mining sectors were strong (i.e., the non-resource boom
sectors of the economy), growing at rates between 6 and 7 percent, and in particular the
manufacturing  sector grew at  a rate  of  5.4 percent  during  the period  of  1977-1982.
Therefore, as Gavin (1996) points out, "what is not apparent from the production data is
anything  resembling  the  crowding  out  of  nonbooming  sectors  depicted  in  "Dutch
disease" theories; in early stages of the oil boom the entire economy grew rapidly, and in
1981-1985 the entire economy was correspondingly depressed."
Table 1.1 Average Annual GDP Growth
1970-1972  1973-1976  1977-1982  1983-1986
Total  6.16  5.95  6.57  -0.44
Agriculture and Fishery  3.56  2.37  3.83  1.44
Mining  2.89  7.60  13.21  -0.72
Manufacturing Industry  6.27  5.68  5.40  -0.50
Construction  4.36  7.97  6.63  -5.36
Electricity, Gas and Water  9.79  10.21  8.89  4.52
Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels  7.21  6.44  8.80  -2.62
Transports & Cormmunications  8.96  9.40  6.77  0.53
Financial Services and Housing  5.31  5.16  4.99  4.20
Other Services  7.08  5.90  5.96  1.13
Imputed Banking Services  7.87  5.47  9.73  3.03
Source: INEGI
1.15  An important feature is that when the authorities were confronted with a negative
oil  shock,  adjustm.lent in  the  oil  industry  was  not  accomplished  via  reductions  in
personnel, but with falling real average earnings (see Figure 1.5). It is interesting to note
that  although  earnings  fell  in  the oil  industry  with  the  1981  shock,  they  remained
considerably above the mean real earnings in other public sector employment.
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1.16  Mexico began  1986 with  a  balance of  payments  crisis,  suspension  of  IMF
financing (a consequence of failing to meet the required fiscal targets), and  lingering
effects of  a major  earthquake occurring in  September  of  the  previous  year. In  this
environment oil prices began a precipitous drop. Between February and March 1986, the
price  per  barrel  fell  from  25  US$  per  barrel  to  10 US$,  a  loss  for  the  year  of
approximately 8.5 billion dollars in incoming foreign currency reserves, or 6.7 percent of
8GDP. 5 The World Bank and the IMF intervened, attempting to alleviate Mexico's  misery
but a severe recession ensued: GDP fell by nearly 4 percent, inflation rose to more than
100 percent and the peso devalued by more than 45 percent. It was also in those years
that the composition of Mexican exports changed radically (recall Figure  1.2), with  a
substantial  reduction  in  the  oil component.  Nevertheless, the  terms  of  trade  remain
heavily influenced by movements in oil prices (see Figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6 Terms of Trade and Oil Prices
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1.17  The relationship between oil prices and inflation is a bit more curious, with oil
prices appearing to lead at times but this is a relationship undoubtedly confounded by the
domestic price-fixing regime (see Figure 1.7). One thing quite apparent in the chart is the
impact of the differing policy responses of the authorities when  faced with  a budget
shortfall in 1986 versus 1998. Monetary financing of the deficit was used in  1986 with
the concomitant rise in inflation, whereas fiscal cuts were the primary response in 1998.
Figure 1.7 Inflation Rate and Oil Prices
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5 Lustig (1992).
91.18  In the second half of the 1980s the Mexican economy continued to struggle. The
authorities implemented  additional  structural  adjustment policies,  with  the  intent  of
opening of the economy, diversifying exports, and augmenting the participation of the
private sector in the economy. From 1987 to  1993 the price of oil fluctuated around a
mean of 14.25 US$ per barrel, with the exception of the Gulf War episode that briefly
raised prices to 30 US$ per barrel. At the same time, the volume of oil exports stabilized
around a level of 1300 thousand barrels per day  (Figure 1.8).
Figure 1.8 Volume of Crude Exports vs. Oil Prices
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1.19  In 1994 oil prices began rising again.  By year-end a large current account deficit
had accumulated, financed largely with volatile short term debt denominated in foreign
currency. Coupled with an overvalued peso and a number of other missteps, the famous
1994-95 crisis ensued. The recession in  1995 was severe, although the recovery was
quicker than in previous crises. During that year oil exports began to rise. Higher exports
with rising prices generated a crucial flow of revenues, important when the economy was
depressed. Although this strategy was effective, it is not a sustainable policy in the long
run.
1.20  The fall in oil prices that began in early 1997 would last until December 1998.
Mexican  authorities continued  increasing  the volume  of  oil  exports  and  production,
attempting to offset the decline in value of oil exports. Apparently the government never
anticipated prices falling to the levels reached the following year and continued investing
in oil infrastructure, a policy consistent an expectation of increased price and demand. 6
The situation in 1998 was difficult for oil producing economies, just as some of the key
importers were entering a turbulent time of their own (East Asian economies). The price
6 This is also the year that the PIDIREGAS investment agreement began. These agreements finance
infrastructure projects with private sector resources. Some projects will become public investment as the
government repays its debt to the private sector, others will become private investment with a long-term
supply contract.
10of Mexican crude reached levels below 7 US$ per barrel in 1998, the lowest price in two
decades.
1.21  In response to the fall in prices the Mexican government signed an agreement
with two major oil producers, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, to contract the international
oil supply. Other OPEC countries soon joined this agreement. Nevertheless, this did not
reign in  the price  decline, in part because  of the  still-depressed  demand  for oil  and
because of  a  lack  of  commitment from some  of the  signers.  In  March  1999 a  new
agreement between eleven major oil producers stopped the fall in oil prices and prices
have recently approached Gulf War and early 1  980s levels.
11II. OIL WINDFALLS: STYLIZED  FACTS
1.22  In this section some of the main findings of the windfall literature are presented. 7
There are two main problems generated by the oil windfall gains that can be identified,
one is the exchange rate overvaluation, and the other is the rise in expenditures by the
public andlor private sector. With regard to exchange rates, the overvaluation reflects an
increase in the relative price of non-traded goods, with factors being shifted away from
the tradable sector and drawn into the production of non-tradable goods. This in  turn
increases the oil dependency of the economy.
1.23  On the expenditure side,  there are  several possible  difficulties  depending on
whether the major impact occurs in the public or in the private sector. When the oil gains
accrue primarily to  the private  sector, myopic responses  from  the  actors may  arise,
carrying  serious  consequences if  the  economy lacks  developed  financial  markets. A
deficient financial market does not provide sufficient instruments to attract savings from
the  producers  who  gain  from  the  windfall,  leading  to  a  sub-optimal  allocation  of
resources in the economy (ex. over-investment in boom-related sectors). Additionally, if
the private beneficiaries of the windfall do not have access to information resources they
may fail to anticipate movements in prices and make inappropriate decisions.
1.24  On the public sector side, the effect may be reflected in procyclical fiscal policies
that exacerbate the cycles of the economy and threaten the long-run sustainability of the
fiscal accounts. From  a theoretical standpoint windfall  gains  should be  viewed as  an
uncommitted rent, as valuable as any other income stream. In practice these revenues
often have been committed to particular uses, mainly the financing of large infrastructure
projects with a concomitant  rise in government consumption. Spending the windfall on
public investment is a prudent tact only if  the internal rate of return  of the financed
projects is higher than the interest rate offered at the international capital markets. The
government  consumption  alternative is  viable  only  if  the  gains  are  expected  to  be
permanent (e.g., if oil prices remain permanently high), a heroic assumption given the
volatility of international oil prices.
1.25  Other problems that may arise along with the windfall  are the increase in net
external  borrowing  and  inflation  growth.  Inflation  often  comes  as  a  byproduct  of
overspending policies. With the onset of a windfall a number of developing countries
increased their external borrowing, benefiting from the willingness of commercial banks
to lend during the bonanza period. However, when oil prices retrench, managing a high
inflationary environment with rising external debt becomes a significant macroeconomic
problem.
1.26  When  analyzing  the  policy  responses  to  oil  windfalls,  it  is  generally
acknowledged  that  there  are  no  "magic  rules"  policy  makers  should  follow  when
confronted with  a  windfall. The particular  conditions of  each  economy will  lead to
different conclusions and policy recommendations that incorporate the specificity of each
case.  However,  there  are  some  lessons  of  what  should  be  avoided,  based  on  the
experience of the last thirty years.
'This  section follows Gelb (1986b) and (1988), Cuddington (1988), and Varangis et.al. (1995).
121.27  It is generally acknowledged that revenues arising from oil windfall gains should
not be treated as a permanent source of income. Experience shows that volatility in oil
prices is high, and non-economic events may trigger a radical movement in these prices;
hence governments should try to limit the expansion of their consumption expenditures
according to their permanent income level. One instrument that helps in this consumption
smoothing process is a revenue stabilization fund (saving during the boom and spending
during  the  bust).  However,  these  funds  have  presented  problems  in  terms  of  the
opportunity cost (forgone investment revenues) and the political pressures that they may
confront.
1.28  An alternative strategy is attempting to increase domestic savings. This can be
achieved by accumulating foreign assets, reducing external debt, increasing investment in
the economy, etc. The best alternative should be chosen based on efficiency and equity
grounds in a  long-run perspective.  International experience shows that  it is common
among governments of developing countries to use windfall gains to finance large public
investment projects. But, as previously mentioned, this alternative is appropriate only if
the  internal rate  of return  of  the projects is  higher  than the  interest  rate  offered  at
international capital markets, difficult to assess ex ante. It is also important consider the
timing of the investment expenditure in order to smooth the cycles in the economy, a feat
requiring near-perfect foresight. A historical review of the efficiency of several public
investment projects indicates many were highly inefficient and did not accomplish their
role of enhancing productivity growth in the economy.
1.29  Another alternative use of the windfall is external debt repayment (or reduction
of borrowing), an attractive alternative depending on the demand for foreign exchange
and the capability of the economy to sustain the level of debt.8
1.30  Modern financial instruments may also be of help in reducing the impact of oil
price  volatility.  Hedging  techniques  may  reduce  price  uncertainty  (but  not  always
revenue uncertainty) with relatively low transactions costs. This technique of stabilizing
revenue can be very successful in protecting the economy from short term fluctuations in
oil prices. However, for this  system to work efficiently,  good financial infrastructure
(e.g., accounting/monitoring systems) and training is prerequisite. For countries that can
fulfill these requirements, hedging seems to be a promising alternative when confronting
an oil windfall. 9
1.31  Finally, it is important to stress the need for tighter monetary policy in order to
control inflationary pressures in the economy. As Varangis et. al. (1995) state, "monetary
policy should balance concerns over inflation with concerns over currency appreciation."
Sterilization can generally be achieved via commodity bonds and investment in foreign
assets.
8  As Cuddington  (1988)  points  out: "it is costly  to repay existing  loans today if the country  is going  to have
to turn around  and  borrow  more  soon  after the  boom has subsided.  The strength  of this  point is enhanced  by
the fact that the cost of borrowing  may be higher after the boom subsides and creditworthiness  is re-
evaluated,"  (p.52).
9 Mexico successfully used hedging techniques to reduce oil price volatility generated by the Gulf War in
the early 1990s.
13III. THE  MANAGEMENT OF OIL RENTS IN MEXICO,  1973 TO 1986
1.32  This section presents estimates of the windfall rents received by Mexico from the
late 1970s to  1986 and analyzes the management of these rents. It is important to note
that the term "windfall" should be used with caution for Mexico, strictly speaking this
term means an unexpected gain or a sudden discovery. As previously mentioned, Mexico
has utilized its oil resources extensively since the beginning of the century. Nevertheless
it was during the late  1970s that  the combination of rising  oil prices,  discoveries of
reserves in the south of the country, and the government's strategy change of opening oil
production to external markets that created a flow of resources to the economy, allowing
characterization as an oil windfall.
1.33  As  previously mentioned, the contribution of  oil to  fiscal revenues  has been
approximately thirty percent, reaching a peak in 1983 (see Figure 1.8).
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1.34  Quantifying the  impact of  oil  windfalls  consists  of  obtaining  the  difference
between  the  actual  outcome  in  oil  and  non-oil  production  against  a  counterfactual
14scenario. This scenario is a projection of the trends the economy would have followed in
the absence of an oil shock. The technique used in this paper to estimate oil windfalls
follows Bevan  et  al (1992).  The  exercise is  done using  national  accounts  statistics,
employing the national income identity,
Y = O+NO  = C+I  +R  (1)
where total production (Y) can be divided in oil (0)  and non-oil (NO) production,'0 that
equals  the  gross  domestic  expenditure  (GDE),  formed  by  consumption  (C)  and
investment (I), plus the resource balance (R).
1.35  To construct a  counterfactual scenario it is necessary to  define a base  period
(denoted superscript h) that serves as a benchmark, reflecting a phase of relative stability
prior to the windfall shock on the economy. 1I  The projections from this base period form
the  counterfactual  scenario.  The  construction  of  this  counterfactual  is  an  arbitrary
exercise and the resulting estimates of the oil windfalls depend much on the assumptions
utilized in the construction process. For example, estimates of the oil windfall for Mexico
over the period 1979-1981 fluctuate from 1.1 to 4.3 percent of GDP, depending on the
technique used to measure the windfall.'2
1.36  In the construction of the counterfactual scenario it is assumed that relative prices
do not change. GDP (both mining and non-mining) is assumed to grow at the base years
rates (1970-1975 for Mexico' 3 ), that is
Y,+1  =(1+ gh)Y'  (2)
where the superscript c denotes the counterfactual scenario and gh  is the average growth
rate in production during  the base period.
1.37  To  obtain  the  counterfactual estimate  for  the  components  of  GDE  and  the
resource balance, consumption and the resource balance are assumed to maintain constant
proportions of GDP from the base period. Investment is obtained as a difference from the
national accounts identity,
Cc  =a  h  Y  (3)
tRc  = )YhYt
'° The division applied in this estimation is between mining and non-mining production. The reason for this
is lack of data on sub-sector production after 1993. Given that on average oil extraction accounts for more
than the half of the mining production, this assumption does not introduce a significant bias in the
estimates.
" It is important to note that the selected base period is used for short-term estimations only. By no means
this can be taken as a long-term trend scenario of the oil sector. Therefore, as windfalls are estimated in
different periods, different base years must be selected.
12 For estimates of the Mexican case see Gavin (1986), Gelb (1988), Tornell and Lane (1994).
13 Although this period was not stable for the overall economy, oil production was relatively stable at that
time.
15where at, IP  are the respective consumption and resource balance average percentage of
GDP during the base period. Table 1.2 shows the estimates employing this technique.'4
1.38  From the estimation it appears that the shock generated Frowth  in both mining
and non-mining GDP, however, in the latter the cumulative effect S is negative (after the
1982 shock).  It can also be seen that public consumption increased even in the midst of
the negative 1982 shock, while private consumption was generally negative.
1.39  Finally, as expected, investment rose during the boom  years but the when the
effects of the  1982 crisis are included, the overall estimate yields a negative outcome.
This is not to say that the country would have been better without the oil windfall. It must
be remembered that inadequate macroeconomic policies and the fall in oil prices caused
the  1982 crisis. Nevertheless, it can be seen that  a significant amount of the benefits
gained from the windfall were lost in subsequent years.
Table 1.2 Oil Windfalls in Mexico, Effects of the Shock
(Million pesos 1993 prices)
GDP  Gross Domestic Expenditure  Resource
Total  Mining  Non-  Total  Public  Private  Investaent Balance I
Mining  Consumption Consumption Consumption
1975  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1976  -12568.4  46.5  -12621.4  -18957.3  6260.8  -25218.1  1413.1  4975.7
1977  -33736.1  134.8  -33885.0  -41943.8  2130.9  -44074.6  -21379.9  29587.6
1978  -16257.9  720.5  -17001.3  -35445.4  4546.3  -39991.6  -8780.1  27967.5
1979  9972.1  1481.4  8457.7  -17175.2  7437.3  -24612.5  9784.1  17363.3
1980  36431.3  3131.9  33254.7  14938.3  10725.7  4212.7  25706.2  -4213.3
1981  62542.1  4376.6  58107.4  29567.5  15177.3  14390.2  50121.3  -17146.7
1982  -5147.5  5038.4  -10259.3  -34589.3  11704.2  -46293.6  -41086.7  70528.4
1983  -113424.1  4364.2  -117879.1  -117145.6  8661.2  -125806.8  -121790.1  125511.6
1984  -146859.3  4104.3  -151074.1  -141764.3  9546.0  -151310.2  -129791.1  124696.1
1985  -193748.2  3487.6  -197368.5  -180295.5  3892.8  -184188.4  -128686.0  115233.4
1986  -311197.1  2230.0  -313584.9  -256519.4  -1496.6  -255022.8  -187689.3  133011.6
Total"'5 -288394.6 14610.3  -303356.0  -356235.2  46246.5  -402481.8  -220387,0  288227.6
a/ Resource balance is defined as the balance of exports minus imports of goods & services, expressed in
local currencies. It can be obtained by subtracting total consumption and investment from total GDP.
1.40  In  order  to  better  assess  these magnitudes,  table  1.3 presents  the  estimated
windfall as a percent of GDP.
14  For this estimate the counterfactual growth rates are 5.6 percent for the mining output and 6.3 percent for
non-mining.
15  This overall balance is estimated as the net present value in 1975 using a 10 percent interest rate.
16Table 1.3 Oil Windfalls in Mexico, Effects of the Shock
(percent of GDP)
GDP  Gross Domestic Expenditure  Resource
Total  Mining  Non-  Total  Public  Private  Investment  Balance
Mining  Consumption  Consumption  Consumption
1975  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1976  -1.78  0.01  -1.79  -2.68  0.89  -3.57  0.20  0.70
1977  -4.62  0.02  -4.64  -5.74  0.29  -6.03  -2.93  4.05
1978  -2.04  0.09  -2.14  -4.45  0.57  -5.02  -1.10  3.51
1979  1.14  0.17  0.97  -1.97  0.85  -2.82  1.12  1.99
1980  3.82  0.33  3.49  1.57  1.12  0.44  2.70  -0.44
1981  6.03  0.42  5.60  2.85  1.46  1.39  4.83  -1.65
1982  -0.50  0.49  -1.00  -3.36  1.14  -4.49  -3.99  6.84
1983  -11.48  0.44  -11.93  -11.86  0.88  -12.74  -12.33  12.71
1984  -14.35  0.40  -14.76  -13.85  0.93  -14.79  -12.68  12.18
1985  -18.45  0.33  -18.80  -17.17  0.37  -17.54  -12.26  10.98
1986  -30.80  0.22  -31.03  -25.39  -0.15  -25.24  -18.57  13.16
1.41  For the sake  of international benchmarking, a  single technique must be  used
across countries. Reproduced  below are the  estimates provided by  Tomell  and  Lane
(1994). The upper panel of Table 1.4 shows the total oil windfall estimate, TOT 16, as a
percentage of GDP and of total exports, X. Here it can be seen that the Mexican windfall
was  small  relative  to  other  countries,  around  0.7  percent  of  GDP,  while  for  other
countries the average was of around 6.5 percent of GDP during the 1979-1982 period.
The lower panel of the table presents the adjustment to the windfall. It is important to
note that  Indonesia responded  with  an  improved current account,  while  the opposite
occurred  for  Mexico  and  Nigeria.  Interestingly, Mexico  responded  with  the  largest
increase in investment, 17 in relative terms, consistent with previous claims regarding the
use of the windfall for Mexico.
1.42  Note  the remarkable increase in  savings during the boom period  for Mexico.
According to Gavin (1996), this increase can be attributed mainly to the private sector. 18
A  possible  interpretation  of  this  is  that  (private)  agents  perceived  the  windfall  as
temporary. Nevertheless, this rise in savings was not enough to ameliorate the current
account deficit. Finally, note that Mexico incurred fiscal deficits, contrary to Indonesia,
which  benefited  from  the  large  windfall  revenues without  radically  expanding  their
expenditures.
16 TOT is defined as the terms of trade shock, or
TOT = X*(%APx/%APm).
"  Gelb (1984) reports that between 1970-1979 Mexico realized 59 macroprojects (costs exceeding $100
million US$), an amount close to 18 percent of GDP. Most were channeled to the hydrocarbons sector.
18 Gavin estimates that around 30 percent of the windfall was saved.
17Table 1.4 International Comparison of Oil Windfalls
Oil Windfall
Indonesia  Mexico  Nigeria
TOT/GDP  TOTIX  TOT/GDP  TOT/X  TOT/GDP  TOTIX
1979  9.7  27.6  0.4  13.1  13.4  26.5
1980  8.6  24.8  2.1  17.8  20.1  15.4
1981  1.5  5.7  0.8  6.8  3.0  9.6
1982  -0.8  -3.4  -0.4  -2.8  -3.0  -7.4
Adjustment to the Windfall
Indonesia  Mexico  Nigeria
ACA/GNP  1.82  -2.35  -1.25
AS/GNP  4.8  8.15  -4.7
AI/GNP  3.7  3.8  -5.9
ARIEV/GDP  3.85  3.1  NA
AEXP/GDP  0.85  5.8  1.55
Note: CA stands for Current Account, S for savings, I for domestic investment, REV for central govemment revenue shares, EXP is
central govemment expenditure. The term A denotes average changes from 1979-82  relative to 1975-77.
Source: Tornell and Lane (1994)
1.43  Figure  1.9 shows that high growth in investment accompanied the rise  in oil
prices  and  the  Mexican  government  decision  of  exploiting  this  commodity. 19 As
discussed  in  the  previous  section,  a  strategy  of  spending  commodity  windfalls  on
investment  may  be  an  effective  alternative. However,  problems  arise  when  large,
inefficient infrastructure projects are financed, compounded if the expenditure timing is
procyclical.  Tornell  and  Lane  (1994)  outline  a  portion  of  the  history  of  Mexican
investment:
(...)  these  projects,  far  from  being  the  realization  of  profitable  investment
opportunities,  were  vehicles  for  redistributing  fiscal  resources.  First  an
agreement with the oil workers' union stipulated that 40 percent of all contracts
granted  by  PEMEX  (...)  were  to  be  awarded  to  the  union  (...)  The  second
example has to do with SOEs, which increased in number from 504 in 1975 to
1155 in 1982. The expansion of the parastatal sector included the bailing out of
struggling private  firms.  The  government  ended  up  owning  a  loss-making
cabaret, a bicycle plant and a cookie producer, among others. Parastatals also
expanded in production capacity. The most prominent example is the industrial
complex developed in the town of Lazaro Cardenas, which consisted of a steel
plant,  a  fertilizer  plant,  a  capital equipment  plant  and  a  big  diameter  pipe
producer. Although the steel plant was designed to produce two million tons of
plate (final good), it did not produce even one million tons of slab (intermediate
good) (...) All these plants had operating losses. The third example concerns a
major  private  industrial  group:  Alfa.  It  embarked  on  an  aggressive
diversification program, financed by  external borrowing.  A number  of these
investments turned out to be unprofitable and in  1981, months before the debt
crisis, it received from the government $500 million to repay its debts.
19 The correlation  of the two  series  during  the period  1979-1998  is 0.82.
18Figure 1.9 Public Investment and Oil Price, 1979-1986
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1.44  Mexico's  history of boom-bust investment is quite apparent in Figure 1.9. Gavin
(1996) calculates that the petroleum windfall resulted in a large transfer of income from
the private to the public sector, particularly after the 1979 oil price increase. His estimates
show  that  from  1975 to  1981 (when oil prices  reached  their peak)  the  oil  windfall
accruing to the public sector approached 51.5 billion US$, while the private sector saw its
income reduced by 16 billion US$ due to oil price increases. External borrowing financed
the remaining budget deficit in the public sector. However, at the same time there was an
implicit  subsidy to  domestic consumers through  domestic oil price  subsidies; the lost
revenues created distortions in relative prices and worsened the fiscal accounts. Estimates
of this subsidy over the period 1975-1987 indicate it fluctuated from 0.2 to 4 percent of
GDP. 2 0
IV.  THE  MANAGEMENT  OF OIL RENTS IN MEXICO, 1986  TO DATE
1.45  Post-1986  the  growing  diversification  in  the  export  sector  resulted  in  the
composition containing a far lower percentage of oil, yet the opportunity for yet another
windfall was on the horizon. In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and  started a crisis
leading to the Gulf War. The duration of this war was short and by the end of February
1991 the United States declared a cease-fire. The uncertainty of the crisis in the Persian
Gulf drove prices in August 1990 to 158 percent of their June level. This incredible rise
generated a  windfall  that quickly vanished (or, better  stated,  never materialized).  By
February oil prices had returned to their pre-war level.
20 Gavin (1996).
191.46  During  this  episode  the  Mexican  government  reacted  differently  based  on
previous experience with oil windfalls (although the fiscal dependency on oil continued,
see  Figure  1.10 below).  Given  the  political  nature  of  the  price  rise,  the  Mexican
authorities anticipated a short-term fluctuation and used hedging techniques to  ensure
fixed revenue from oil exports in case the war ended quickly. This management of the
windfall allowed the Mexican authorities to benefit from the large but short-lived rising
prices without exposing the economy to the negative consequences that followed.
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1.47  After the Gulf War episode, international oil prices remained relatively stable for
the next three years and started rising again in 1994. As oil prices rose over the 1995-
1996 period, the volume of exports rose  as well (recall Figure  1.7). In Table  1.5 the
estimation of this windfall  is presented. For this  exercise the selected base  years are
1991-1993, when the price of oil was relatively stable.
20Table 1.5 Oil Windfalls in Mexico, Effects of the Shock
(Million  pesos 1993  prices)
GDP  Gross Domestic Expenditure  Resource
Total  Mining  Non-  Total  Public  Private  Investment  Balance
Mining  Consumption  Consumption  Consumption
1993  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1994  20422.4  160.3  20257.3  16030.4  -314.1  16344.5  22750.2  -18358.2
1995  -96487.9  -542.3  -95958.0  -105585.4  -6172.6  -99412.8  -85939.7  95037.1
1996  -70087.5  513.1  -70623.7  -118362.1  -11300.9  -107061.2  45252.5  93189.5
1997  -20676.5  1033.5  -21746.8  -90128.0  -11472.1  -78656.0  6504.2  62633.3
1998  6483.8  1386.7  5043.2  -65333.8  -17661.4  -47672.3  23475.7  48341.9
Total 2 '  -123930.5  1650.0 -125671.0  -263740.5  -32679.3  -231061.2  -65322.3  204664.4
1.48  Table  1.6 presents  these estimates  as a percentage  of GDP
Table 1.6 Oil Windfalls in Mexico, Effects of the Shock
(percent  of GDP)
GDP  Gross Domestic Expenditure  Resource
Total  Mining  Non-  Total  Public  Private  Investment  Balance
Mining  Consumption  Consumption  Consumption
1993  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1994  1.56  0.01  1.54  1.22  -0.02  1.25  1.73  -1.40
1995  -7.84  -0.04  -7.80  -8.58  -0.50  -8.08  -6.98  7.72
1996  -5.42  0.04  -5.46  -9.15  -0.87  -8.27  -3.50  7.20
1997  -1.50  0.07  -1.57  -6.52  -0.83  -5.69  0.47  4.53
1998  0.45  0.10  0.35  -4.51  -1.22  -3.29  1.62  3.34
1.49  From tables 1.5 and  1.6 it can be seen that the price rise of  1994 generated a
small windfall in the mining sector. This allowed the Mexican government to recover part
of  the  1995 recession induced  fiscal shortfall with  oil  revenues (recall Figure  1.10).
Additionally, given the recent devaluation episode, when transformed to Mexican pesos
the oil revenues from exports (in US$) had a greater impact in the economy. One relevant
feature from the estimates is that, contrary to the 1980s episode, government restrained
consumption  in  the  crisis.  Investment  fell  in  the  first  years  after  the  crisis  before
recovenng.
1.50  During this period consolidated PEMEX revenues grew at a 12 percent rate per
year in real terms, and part of these revenues were reinvested to expand the productive
capacity of PEMEX. An important feature of this period is that the Mexican government
allowed  the  rise  in  domestic  prices  of  hydrocarbons,  which  helped  adjust  the
misalignment of internal pricing with external.
21 This overall balance is estimated as the net present value in 1993 using a 10 percent interest rate.
211.51  Authorities attempted to offset the  severe reduction  in  oil prices occurring in
1997 with increased exports. However, this measure did not stem the tide of deteriorating
public sector revenues, forcing the authorities to adopt fiscal austerity measures. Among
the policy reactions were severe expenditure cuts in non-salary current expenditures and
investment expenditures, in particular, infrastructure projects for PEMEX, CFE and the
transportation sector (see Figure  1.11). Increases in the value added tax and the IEPS 22
rate also helped alleviate fiscal pressures.
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1.52  As oil prices began recovering in the second quarter of 1999, it appears another
oil windfall is in the offing, whose duration cannot be predicted. The size of this windfall
may not  to be  very  large due to production/export cutbacks agreed to  in  early 1999.
Nevertheless, revenues  generated by  this  "windfall"  have been  used  to  offset  fiscal
pressures resulting from delays in privatizing airports. However, in the budget approved
for the  year 2000, a political  struggle within  congress resulted in  some  expected oil
revenues  being  earmarked  for  increased  social  expenditure. 23 In  particular,  more
optimistic scenarios on future oil prices resulted in an expenditure plan greater than the
original budget presented. In addition, if oil revenues surpass these budgeted amounts,
the remaining resources would be used to fund higher non-programmable expenditures
(in particular, interest payments), to make transfers to subnational governments, and to
repay debt.
22 IEPS  stands  for "Impuesto  Especial  sobre  Producci6n  y Servicios",  and  is a commercial  excise  tax paid
for gasoline,  diesel,  and natural  gas used  in vehicles.
23 "Recortes  al gasto  publico,  anticipa  Ernesto  Zedillo",  El Financiero,  January  6, 2000,  p.8.
22V. POLICY  ALTERNATIVES
1.53  Oil production plays an important role in Mexican economy. Approximately one-
third of Government revenues comes from the hydrocarbon sector and, in particular, from
oil exports. The reliance of public finance on a  single commodity creates  a potential
situation where shocks may threaten the fiscal balance and stability of the economy.
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1.54  In front of this situation several policy alternatives must be carefully examined in
order to  protect the  economy from volatility in oil revenues, without  eliminating the
benefits that arise when prices rise. Two policy alternatives already mentioned to face the
instability in oil revenues are stabilization funds and hedging strategies on international
markets.
1.55  On one side the use of hedging instruments is an attractive alternative. Options
can be used to protect producers from declining prices, allowing them to benefit from
upward movements in prices. However, there are some problems behind this  strategy.
First,  the  administration  of  these  instruments  is  complex  and  knowledge  intensive.
Second, the size of the markets is still small if compared to  the amounts that  a large
producer would  like  to  hedge. Finally, premiums  can be  expensive  especially in  an
environment of volatile prices, (which is the case of oil).
1.56  On the other side stabilization funds have the advantage of generating a smooth
consumption pattern  by  saving  extraordinary revenues  and  by  depleting  the  fund's
balance in front of a price downturn. Nevertheless in order to establish  a stabilization
fund, prices must not follow a random walk process and a good alternative on where to
save the fund's resources must be available. Also clear and strict rules must be issued to
isolate the fund from political pressures. For a detailed discussion of these topics refer to
23Varangis  and Larson  (1996),  Engel and Meller  (1993), Arrau  and  Claessens  (1992),
Lewin (1999).24
1.57  In this section we present as an exercise a back of the envelope estimation of a
stabilization fund for Mexican oil exports revenues. The methodology is based on one of
the funds presented in Basch and Engel (1993) for a simple case where the country that
establishes the fund has no restrictions to credit. The implications of using this simple
case are analyzed below, as well as some other insights needed to build a more realistic
fund.
1.58  The main  assumption underlying  this  stabilization  fund  is  that  the  designer
country can invest or save a fraction of its windfall income, and it can borrow when oil
revenues are below  their average value. By  assuming a quadratic instantaneous utility
function and an interest rate r equal to the rate of discount  5, we can obtain an optimal
rule of consumption equal to:




t  t-l_1  l+r  (yv -v)
where y, is oil exports income at period t,  y  is the average of these revenues and r is the
interest rate coupon paid by a long-term bond. 25 The optimal consumption rule says that
the consumption at period t should equal the average revenues from oil exports plus (or
minus) the accumulated fraction of surplus (or deficit) in revenues that can be supported
in the long run (by means of the paid coupons). Thus, as Basch and Engel claim "the
average level of consumption with or without the optimal stabilization fund is the same;
however, income uncertainty is considerably lower with a fund".
1.59  The accumulated balance of the fund at period t+1 is: 26
At,+1  (+  r, XA,  + y,  -c,)
24 Actually  of the major  stabilization  fands  implemented  in Latin  America,  only  the Chilean  Copper
Stabilization  Fund  (CSF) has  positively  contributed  to build  a strong  fiscal  stance.
25 For this  exercise  it was selected  an unweighted  average  of the rates  paid by U.S. coupons  with maturity
greater  than 10  years.
26 Since  these  conditions  are derived  from a finite-horizon  optimization  problern,  at the final  period  T the
condition that should hold is AT=O,  however for the objectives of this study this condition is not relevant,
since we have not determined when T would take place. For a general exposition of these models see
Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
241.60  For this exercise the fund was estimated as if it were established in January 1986,
at the end of the great fall in prices of that year. One of the requirements to create a fund
like the  previously  sketched is  to  have  an  idea  of  the  long-run  level  of  oil  export
revenues. For this purpose the ideal would be to have an econometric model of revenues
and oil prices. Given that these prices (and revenues) are influenced by a wide variety of
factors (including demand-driven factors, oligopolistic reactions from suppliers, political
events, etc.), finding a straightforward time series model for them is not an easy task. For
that reason, and given that we are only presenting an approximate estimation of an oil
stabilization fund and its  advantages, we  do not undertake  that modeling  alternative.
Instead, we calculate the long-run level of oil revenues by using the mean estimated at
time t. In other words we use y,  instead of y.  As a more complex model of the behavior
followed by prices and revenues becomes available this estimation can be improved.
1.61  Another  drawback  of  the  designed  stabilization  fund  here  presented  is  the
assumption of full credit availability for the exporter country. The problem is evident:
when prices fall the international financial markets are reluctant to lend to the commodity
exporter countries. To solve this problem an empirical version of saving models in front
of borrowing constraints (e.g. Deaton, 1991) could be implemented. Some applications of
these models to the stabilization fund case have been presented in Arrau and Claessens
(1992) and  Hausmann  et.  al. (1993). Nevertheless,  the requirements  to  estimate the
statistical processes followed by prices and revenue are too demanding (and still under
methodological discussion) to be undertaken in this first approach exercise.
1.62  Figure  1.12 presents oil exports revenues versus the monthly savings generated
by the fund. As it can be seen the fund responds efficiently to changes in revenues.
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251.63  The accumulated resources in the fund at period t are presented in Figure 1.  13. It
must be  remembered that negative values mean that the country is  incurring debt to
finance the optimal consumption path. In this plot it can be seen that in front of the most
recent downturn in prices in 1997-98 the fund would have financed the forgone revenues
and it would have avoided the radical cuts in expenditure that actually took place.
Figure 1.13 The accumulated balance and oil prices
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1.64  Although these estimations are very raw and need to be refined, they illustrate
the advantages of having a  stabilization fund, in terms of smoothing consumption and
reducing the costs associated to volatile expenditures.
1.65  Finally, for the case of oil revenues both the stabilization fund and the hedging
strategy can work as complements rather than as substitutes. While the fund can work as
the main recipient of revenues, hedging strategies can be  used to manage  short-lived
movements in prices. This joint strategy would also reduce the size of the fund and the
probability that the fund go bankrupt.
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